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Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital 
his article focuses on the relationship between intellectual property 
and intellectual capital. The broader concept of 'intellectual capital' 
is a useful framework within which to analyse the relative merits 
and drawbacks of reliance on proprietary rights over knowledge. Strategic 
analysis of the costs, risks and benefits of various forms of proprietary 
protection is vital in the context of rapid innovation in a 'knowledge 
economy'. Maximising the value of the intellectual capital of the firm will 
require: a considered assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of each 
IP regime; combining reliance on the rules of intellectual property law with 
other strategies; and re-evaluating the utility, function and expectations of 
intellectual property protection in general. This article presents some 
tentative conclusions concerning strategies to protect the intellectual 
capital of the innovative firm. Its main themes are: (i) That intellectual 
property will not be effective in protecting many aspects of intellectual 
capital; (ii) That combining reliance on the rules of IP law with other 
strategies will maximise the firm's control over intellectual capital; (iii) 
That the real value of intellectual property rights may lie rather in their 
transactional utility than in restricting competition-by-imitation; (iv) That 
there may be advantages in investing in goodwill, rather than technological 
innovation and ideas; and (v) That a firm should primarily focus its 
intellectual capital strategies on maximising the value of the tacit 
knowledge of its employees. 
ntellectual Capital 
ht~oduction 
The concept 'intellectual capital' is no longer new. 
ntellectual capital is more than just intellectual 
woperty. Intellectual capital consists of all the 
ntangible assets of the firm, whether or not they 
Ire the subject of exclusive legal rights, and 
vhether or not they appear on the balance sheet1. 
'irguably most intellectual capital does not appear 
IS intangible assets (eg as trade marks, patents, 
opyright etc.) on the balance sheet2. For instance, 
;enera1 knowledge, skill and experience of 
mployees, organisational culture, organisational 
tructures, learning ability, and technological 
zadership are components of the intellectual 
apital of the firm that are not, or only marginally, 
overed by intellectual property rights (IPR's), and 
o not normally figure on balance sheets3. 
'he concept 'intellectual capital' is not only a 
lanagement tool, but also provides a useful 
-amework for legal analysis. It places intellectual 
roperty in the context of the totality of the firm's 
ltellectual assets, and focuses a lawyer's mind on 
broader strategic issues in the use and deployment 
of IPR's. 
Information and knowledge. 
Intellectual capital consists of knowledge or 
information4. Are there relevant differences between 
the two? It may be that knowledge is simply one 
subcategory of information; however, I make a 
qualitative distinction here, and view information as 
static, whereas knowledge is dynamic5. Knowledge 
is information in action, information understood 
and put to use. The term knowledge implies a 
connection between information and a constant 
process of learning, and is thus associated with 
novelty, originality, innovation, and progression in 
terms of what is known and understood6. 
Knowledge is the ability to acquire and deal with 
information in an effective goal-oriented manner. 
Knowledge is more valuable to the firm than mere 
information. At the very least, a firm needs to 
optimise acquisition of information and knowledge 
to compete effectively. 
Tacit and codified knowledge 
For a firm, knowledge can be usefully characterised 
as either 'tacit', if it is contained in the minds of 
employee's; or 'explicit' if it is 'codified', ie 
expressed in some record from which it can be 
retrieved. Although codified knowledge is valuable 
because it can be inventoried and shared between 
members of the firm, it usually requires 
interpretation and understanding to be turned to 
account. Therefore, in an innovation driven 
economy, although knowledge can be externalized 
and recorded, it can rarely be efficiently traded 
separately from people. 
An analogous distinction can be made between 
structural and human capital: human capital is the 
employees; structural capital is what remains 
behind when all employees go home7. Structural 
intellectual capital includes databases, precedents, 
structures, manuals, training materials etc. 
Structural capital is usually owned by the firm, 
and is transferred by the firm, whereas human 
capital is most commonly transferred in the mind 
of the individual employee, outside the control of 
the firm. 
Appropriation and transfer of tacit knowledge 
The fact that a large proportion of useful 
knowledge is tacit knowledge, ie human capital, 
has important implications in terms of the 
intellectual capital strategy of the firm. Codified 
knowledge is more susceptible to appropriation, 
zontrol and structured acquisition or disposition 
2y the firm; it is more easily converted into 
ntellectual property, even though not all codified 
tnowledge is potentially covered by IPR's. By 
:ontrast, as tacit knowledge is contained within 
.he minds of employees, it is as mobile and as 
mcontrollable as the employees themselves, and 
argely outside the province of intellectual 
xoperty laws. 
rhat part of human capital that is not subject to 
:edification and to the constraints of intellectual 
)roperty law, is only 'of the firm' in a transitory 
~ n d  relative sense. Rules relating to acquisition 
~nd  control of tacit knowledge are mostly within 
he domain of labour law, which largely 
letermines the rights of employees in terms of 
erminating employment, entering into new labour 
rrangements or setting up competing businesses. 
n other words, labour markets, not knowledge 
varkets determines the mobility and transfer of 
acit knowledge. 
he Knowledge Economy 
%aracteristics 
'he 'knowledge economy' is a ubiquitous concept 
arely defined9. It is often proffered as the third 
stage of economic development, following on from 
agricultural and industrial stages. A knowledge 
economy is characterised by a huge discrepancy 
between the cost of inputs of labour, capital, energy 
and raw materials, and the value of industrial 
outputlo. In other words, it supports productivity 
growth despite static or declining inputs of 
manpower and other resources. 
In terms of the firm, knowledge accounts for a large 
and increasing proportion of the price differential 
that it can command for its goods and services, and 
the difference between the realisable value of assets 
and stock value. A useful way of thinking about the 
difference between a knowledge economy and an 
industrial economy is to compare value and weight 
of goods: over the duration of the 2oth century, the 
value of goods for a constant weight has increased 
exponentially. The additional value is the result of 
the knowledge contents of the goods; it is not the 
result of scarcity since the growth outstrips the 
expansion of overall inputs of goods and servicesll 
Evolution from an industrial to a knowledge 
economy characteristically means a transition from 
physical to intellectual capital. 
Knowledge markets 
In a knowledge-based market economy knowledge 
production is increasingly a market function: firms, 
as well as public institutions, invest considerable 
resources in the production of new knowledge and 
information12. The rate and direction of production 
of knowledge is largely determined by the market 
rather than by external factors13. Knowledge 
accumulation is driven by profit motives rather than 
advancement of the public interest. As a 
consequence there is also an intensification of 
activity in expanding knowledge markets - the value 
of exchange increases rapidly. Although much 
knowledge is at present still produced in a 'public 
domain' environment, ie not subject to proprietary 
control, the knowledge economy is characterised by 
an expansion of knowledge subject to appropriation 
by way of intellectual property rights. 
Appropriation of knowledge 
As the knowledge market expands, and private 
investment in knowledge assets grows, pressure on 
regulators to shift more knowledge from the public 
to the private domain rises. In terms of law, there 
results a trend towards extending the reach of 
proprietary rights over knowledge. This trend is 
often criticised because the resulting contraction of 
the public domain may have a negative impact on 
productivity, by driving up the cost of knowledge 
and the transaction costs of knowledge acquisition. 11 
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Recently, certain patents in the field of 
biotechnology and genetics, and the supposed 
trend to allow business method patents have been 
the focus of such criticism14. 
Increased proprietisation of knowledge drives up 
the cost of learning. Privatisation of education (ie 
moving educational resources from the public to 
the private sphere) combined with a tendency to 
assert proprietary rights over knowledge 
in educational institution, have further cost and 
organisational implications for the innovative 
firmT5. 
Technological innovation in  the knowledge 
economy 
Technology and technological innovation lie at the 
heart of the knowledge economy. Certain 
technological trends reflect the transition from an 
industrial to a knowledge economy. First, 
increased complexity: products consist of more 
individual components, reflecting more complex 
technological parameters. Secondly, products have 
a higher knowledge content, ie are ultimately 
based on and developed from theoretical insight 
and scientific experiment, rather than from 
practical experience16. Thirdly, families of 
technologies often have a common generic science 
base with multiple and varied applications that 
develop over time within measurable 
parameters17. Fourthly, technological products are 
more interdependent, ie various technologies inter- 
operate in a complimentary fashion. Fifthly, 
technology has a much shorter 
redundancyIinnovation cycle and shorter product 
life cycle. 
As a consequence, technological change becomes a 
matter of collaboration rather than individual 
~ffort:  most inventions are made by collaboration 
between individuals or organisations, rather than 
by single individuals or isolated entities. Increased 
:ethnological complexity inevitably results in 
ncreased organisational complexity, through a 
xocess of organisational innovation that matches 
md enables technological change. In terms of law, 
he knowledge economy is typified, therefore, by 
:xpansion in the scope and complexity of both 
ntellectual property rights and contractually 
jefined collaborative organisational structures. 
lcquisition and dissemination of knowledge 
n conditions of greater technological complexity, 
ihorter innovation cycles, greater knowledge 
:ontent etc. firms must develop a capacity both to 
lcquire and to disseminate knowledge rapidly. A 
irm acquires knowledge in a number of ways. It 
can be developed in-house, for instance by 
investment in R&D. It may be acquired as such 
externally (eg in the form of intellectual property), 
or by acquisition of other firms, or by imitation. It 
may also be acquired externally by hiring employees 
with the requisite knowledge; or it may be bought in 
as training and consultancy services. 
There is little doubt that most efficient knowledge 
acquisition occurs by way of learning, rather than 
structured acquisition. In the knowledge economy, 
firms as producers or acquirers of knowledge must 
be learnzng organisations; as suppliers of products 
and services they are teaching organisations. Both 
learning and teaching are constant functions of the 
firm in the knowledge economy. In terms of the law, 
learning and teaching result predominantly in the 
growth of human rather than physical capital. Much 
of the process of learning and teaching is a form of 
information exchange that are not structured on the 
basis of any kind of legal rules. 
Knowledge management and intellectual property 
rights 
For the individual firm, survival in a knowledge 
economy requires efficient acquisition and 
management of knowledge and information. These 
are critical to the firm's competitiveness even in a 
'traditional' sector. Organisational innovation will 
be primarily aimed at devising more effective ways 
of obtaining, controlling and managing 
information18. A number of environmental 
determinants as well as organisational culture will 
influence the knowledge management strategy of the 
firm 19. 
One of the firm's most important tools for the 
management of knowledge is intellectual property 
law. But efficiently managing IPR's alone does not 
equate to managing intellectual capital, which 
requires integrated strategies derived from an 
understanding of technology, of the market 
conditions within which a firm operates, and of the 
limitations of intellectual property law. It requires an 
understanding of alternative, non-proprietary 
strategies for controlling and extracting maximum 
value from intellectual capital as a whole: ie an 
integrated and 'holistic' approach. 
Knowledge Networksz0 
Public and private sector networks 
Technological progress no longer relies exclusively 
on gradual improvement through learning by doing, 
but on interpretation and exchange of complex 
scientific knowledge in the development of practical 
applications. Whereas scientific knowledge is stil! 
produced In large measure in the public sector 
(universities and government research 
establishments), private sector investment in 
science has grown over time; more recently, so has 
public sector interest in proprietary rights. 
Previously the production of basic knowledge was 
largely separated from the application of that 
knowledge, paralleling a relatively rigid separation 
between public and private sector R&D. Now the 
two stages are increasingly integrated. 
Indeed, contemporary innovation policy focuses 
almost exclusively on fostering efficient 
integration of the various stages of innovation, 
recognising that the traditional linear model of 
innovation is flawed. As a result, the production 
of knowledge has become a more market-driven 
activity, rather than one purely directed at 
education and the advancement of the public 
interest, which coincidentally impacts on markets. 
Much of the change has come about because of 
shifts in public and government attitudes to public 
funding of research, and increasing emphasis on 
the production of proprietary knowledge within 
universities and public research establishments. 
Overall, science and Academe, and innovation 
and commerce have become more closely 
integrated within various legal and organisational 
models. These arrangements are often complex 
and constantly mutating, requiring efficient 
collaboration and knowledge sharing within 
broad 'knowledge networks'. 
Access to proprieta y knowledge inventories 
Given the wealth of available knowledge, the 
speed and diversity of its production, and the 
technological complexity and interdependence of 
products, no single firm controls all knowledge 
resources that it needs. Firms require access to 
each other's inventories of proprietary knowledge, 
and to proprietary knowledge held by publicly 
funded institutions. Firms are interdependent as 
far as both tacit and codified knowledge are 
concerned. 
As the perceived value of knowledge mounts, 
attempts to appropriate knowledge grow more 
determined. Almost inevitably more knowledge 
becomes subject to intellectual property law, and 
what rights already exist are exercised more 
aggressively. Thus, at the very least, firms will 
require strategies which grant access to and use of 
I number of other firms' intellectual property 
resources. 
But arms-length acquisition of codified knowledge 
s often of limited effectiveness. More productive 
s first, access to both codified and tacit 
knowledge; and secondly, continuous access to 
knowledge that is constantly and rapidly evolving. 
Thus a knowledge economy is marked by the search 
for access to proprietary knowledge through the 
creation of relationships which congeal into 
networks of interdependency. 
At the same time, empirical evidence shows that 
there is a trend towards diversification and 
decentralization of research and development 
activity2I. This trend gives rise to new forms of 'loose 
consolidation', although consolidation into single 
corporate units by way of acquisitions is still 
common. Start-ups, spin-offs, Cooperative Research 
Centres, joint ventures, dutsourcing, private-public 
sector arrangements such as sponsorships and grants, 
etc proliferate in this market. Such trends reflect a 
need for co-operation that goes beyond hands-off 
acquisition of technology, while respecting the . 
diverse and serendipitous pursuit that is R&D, and 
the dynamic nature of knowledge. 
Discrepancy between products and intellectual 
property rights 
When technological sophistication advances, 
increased complexity and versatility of products 
results. There follows a discrepancy between 
intellectual property rights and products. In other 
words, rarely does a single intellectual property right 
cover a single product, and as a result a number of 
intellectual property owners will have a stake in any 
given product22. IPR's, such as patents, play an 
increasingly important role in structuring essential 
transactions between disparate knowledge 
proprietors in the production of complex products23. 
Complex technologies with simple interfdces 
The increased 'scientific content' and complexity of 
products, and the ubiquity of mass-market 
technology result in a difficulty for the innovator: 
how to make inherently complex products usable to 
the average person without specialist knowledge or 
experience. The problem is solved by producing 
simple and uniform interfaces between man and 
machine. This results in technological convergence: 
one interface and a single learning process gives a 
consumer access to a multiplicity of products from 
different suppliers. The problem is also solved by 
binding customer to supplier by a process of constant 
learning and support. 
The knowledge economy thus generates greater 
dependency and integration between customer and 
supplier, as well as dependency between suppliers24. 
Communities of learning grow around technologies, 
both of producers and suppliers and of producers 13 
and customers. 
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Network economic effects 
Recent scholarship has attempted to draw 
conclusions concerning intellectual property law 
from 'network  economic^'^^. For our purposes, 
the basic tenet of the latter is that as the number 
of users of a technology increases, so does the 
value of the technology to each user26. At the 
same time, according to static economic theory, 
the more units of the technology produced, the 
lower production costs per unit are. As the cost to 
the supplier of the technology decreases, the value 
to the consumer increases. Thus proprietary 
technologies that enjoy network effects tempt the 
proprietor to raise the level of monopoly rents (ie 
pricelunit), inflating profit levels because of lower 
per-unit costs. As the installed base of a 
technology grows, so should its price, at least 
where competitors can be denied because of IPR's. 
Networks also tend to be 'sticky', ie there is often 
a considerable cost attached to a consumer 
extracting herself from a network based on a 
certain technology (eg learning, new investment, 
uncertainties about compatibility, transfer of data, 
of addresses e t ~ . ) ~ ~ .  In other words, first movers 
create a valuable commodity: dependency. 
For the knowledge based firm network economic 
effects and 'stickiness' mean that material first- 
mover advantages will often result in pricing 
strategies with initial low returns28. There is an 
obvious correlation between material first-mover 
advantages and the structure of intellectual 
property law, because the grant of property rights 
is usually tied to the novelty or originality of the 
product or work. This is at once the purpose and 
the curse of IPR's: additional rents for innovators 
risk becoming excessive rents because they are 
compounded by structural first-mover advantages. 
What is important in this context is that there is a 
:oncornitant risk of rival technologies being 
mtirely frozen out of the marketplace, irrespective 
~f their substantive merits. To avoid this risk, 
5rms must be in a position to negotiate access on 
:ompetitive terms, either by collaborating on the 
ievelopment of standard-setting technology, or by 
3ositioning themselves to bargain effectively on 
:he basis of their own indispensable knowledge 
nventory. 
'aterim conclusions: intellectual property & 
'ntellectual capital in  a knowledge economy 
rhree points result from the above. First, the 
imited reach of intellectual property law in 
,elation to intellectual capital as a whole, requires 
I firm to develop a strategy that incorporates both 
reliance on IPR's and elements that do not rely on 
proprietary rights. Secondly, the predominance of 
tacit knowledge within intellectual capital as a 
whole requires a firm to focus primarily on efficient 
practices in hiring and retaining knowledge-rich 
employees. In this process intellectual property law 
plays only a minor role. And thirdly, the importance 
of effective participation in knowledge networks 
focuses attention on the transactional utility of 
intellectual property rights, rather than there value 
in terms of interdicting imitation. 
The limitations of IPR's already referred to above 
are analysed further below first. Then some broad 
strategic options that flow from the three points 
here made are put forward. 
The Limitations of Intellectual Property Law 
Generally 
It is indisputable that the importance of intellectual 
property rises in a knowledge economy. Yet 
intellectual property is only concerned with a 
fraction of all knowledge, and is not even all that 
effective in controlling that fraction. Hence the 
market for intellectual capital can not be equated 
with the market for intellectual property. 
Furthermore, in a networked and interdependent 
knowledge economy the primary function of 
intellectual property law changes. From interdiction, 
it becomes cooperation. In other words, the main 
focus shifts from IPR's as combative rights that 
exclude, prohibit or interdict access to knowledge, 
to IPR's as transactional tools. It is in this light that 
in the following paragraphs I consider the 
limitations of intellectual property rights and the 
changing role of intellectual property law in the 
knowledge economy. 
Tacit knowledge and intellectual propevty law 
Compared to the intellectual capital of the firm as a 
whole, the scope and extent of intellectual property 
coverage is quite limited. I have already pointed out 
that much intellectual capital consists of tacit 
knowledge that is retained in the minds of 
employees. Such knowledge is only marginally 
affected by the rules of intellectual property law, 
because there is often little by way of IP law that an 
employer can do to exercise effective control over 
knowledge acquired on the job. The courts tend to 
favor the employee's freedom of employment over 
the employer's interests in controlling allegedly 
proprietary knowledge29. In other words, knowledge 
diffusion in a knowledge economy is to a 
considerable extent regulated by labour markets and 
labour law. It is also a matter of contract law, ie the 
formation of new legal constructs that allow access 
to tacit knowledge on an ongoing, hands-on 
basis30. 
Limited scope and extent: patchy coverage 
Intellectual property law also does not cover 
general knowledge, learning, know-how or 
experience; only very specific and clearly identified 
knowledge falls within its embrace. Thus there are 
no patents in discoveries or laws of science and 
the like, but only in specific applications of such 
knowledge. Copyright does not extend to the 
ideas expressed in a work. Trade secrets 
protection only extends to information specific 
enough to be demonstrably not in the public 
domain. 
And rights run out over time. However, trade 
marks and other forms of protection for goodwill 
do not run out unless the owner of the right lets 
this happen31. For that reason alone, such rights 
over reputation have potentially greater future 
value, a point to which I return to below. But even 
a trade mark monopoly is subject to many 
restrictions, limitations and exceptions: the 
owner's control over a mark is not absolute. In 
general terms, the specificity of IP rights means 
that certain competitiveIimitative practices fall 
through the cracks between the different regimes. 
[ntellectual property protection will always remain 
patchy, because the law aims to strike a balance 
between effective incentive and the public interest 
n free or low cost access to knowledge and 
nformation. 
Local rights in  a global economy 
(nowledge as a tradeable commodity lends itself 
o the geographical expansion of trade, since cost 
ind complexity of distribution are minimal in 
.elation to the value of knowledge. In a world 
vith relatively homogenous levels of education, 
,imilar legal systems, a common linguistic base, 
md common communication platforms 
[nowledge can be readily exchanged. Reduced 
.osts of travel, transport and communication ease 
he way for a global trade in knowledge and in 
:nowledge based goods and services. Students, 
eachers and manpower in general become mobile, 
onstituting the principle mode of knowledge 
listribution. Knowledge about technology tends 
o be universally valued, whereas the value of 
lther knowledge (eg about cultural rites) tends to 
le more location-specific. Technology tends to 
ave universal appeal and thus value in any 
ational marketplace in which the requisite 
xhnical and institutional conditions apply. 
'hat the knowledge economy is global is reflected 
in the determination and enforcement of higher 
universal standards of legal protection for 
intellectual property32. Nonetheless, at present the 
detailed regulation of intellectual property is still a 
largely domestic matter, which creates difficulties for 
the knowledge based firm which trades across 
borders. 
Although there are global treaty systems relating to 
intellectual property law and to intellectual property 
law and trade (TRIPSNTO), IPR's are in fact still 
In some trading blocks there is a slow move 
towards multilateral forms of protection (eg the 
European Patent Convention), but in effect the 
treaties leave governments quite free to regulate 
intellectual property law within flexible boundaries. 
Copyright, because it does not depend on 
registration, is the most universal form of 
protection, by way of the Berne Convention - but 
even then enforcement will be in accordance with 
local rules in any other member country. Legal rules, 
and courts and officers enforcing those rules may be 
less than sympathetic to foreign intellectual property 
owners in some  jurisdiction^^^. Relying on local law 
in a foreign jurisdiction may be ineffective, 
expensive and risky. The registration systems, ie 
patents, designs and trade marks protection, are 
local and restricted to a single jur isdi~t ion~~.  
Multiple applications are required, for multiple 
jurisdictions, with uneven effects. Thus although the 
knowledge economy is global, proprietary 
protection is uneven and not seamless. 
The expense of intellectual property 
Which brings me to my next point: the expense of 
effective intellectual property protection in a global 
economy. In a global economy it will be necessary to 
invest similar amounts in a number of jurisdictions, 
with spiraling costs. That is even before any expense 
of enforcing the patent (ie going to court or just 
hiring lawyers to advise) is taken into account36. 
Patents are certainly the most expensive form of 
intellectual property protection, but there are not 
insignificant costs attached to other regimes as well. 
The real expense is even greater if one takes into 
account the uncertainties and therefore risks 
inherent in the process of applying for, obtaining 
and enforcing intellectual property rights in any 
jurisdiction. Intellectual property rules tend to 
follow slowly upon new technological developments, 
resulting in periods of adjustment and uncertainty 
precisely in relation to the most valuable 
technologies. Application of the law is unpredictable 
even within an IPR owner's home jurisdiction, let 15 
alone in foreign jurisdictions where competitors may 
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have competing vested interests in similar IPR's 
(eg the problem of local goodwill in a foreign 
trade mark). 
Proprietary rights and publicity 
The most important form of intellectual property 
in the context of innovation also has the 
drawback of publicity. Patents grant is dependent 
on an enabling disclosure: obtaining the 
monopoly requires divulging to competitors the 
nature of your knowledge in detail. A dilemma 
faces the firm: to choose secrecy without 
monopoly or monopoly without secrecy37? 
Reliance on trade secrets law may have limited 
utility because of the ease of reverse-engineering 
once the product is sold; trade secrets law does 
not normally prohibit reverse-engineering as 
Trade secrets law also has the drawback 
that although damages or a temporary restraint 
may be available as a remedy for illegal 
disclosure, information irretrievably looses much 
of its value once it is in the public domain. Legal 
remedies can hardly ever fully restore the 
proprietor to his previous position, since he loses 
the advantage of secrecy not only in relation to 
the infringer but in relation to the world at large. 
On the other hand, although patent grant results 
In a monopoly right, statutory publication may 
serve competitors in all sorts of ways. A patent 
lags the research path the applicant has chosen; it 
lags the nature of the technology and may suggest 
uays of invention around; and it may mean that 
mother person obtains an improvement patent 
.elated to the invention, leaving a cross-licensing 
&lemma. A patent may well present an important 
ethnological breakthrough, but it is frequently 
mly the gradual improvements that occur 
ubsequently that result in a marketable and 
~rofitable product. Thus there will commonly be 
denty of time for a competitor to position itself to 
ibsorb the market impact of the new product, and 
leny the patentee much of its potential 
ompetitive advantage. Competitors will not 
nfringe IPR's, they'll simply use them as a 
tepping stone to overtake the patentee in the race 
o innovate. 
Talidity of granted rights is limited 
ntellectual property rights that are granted on the 
lasis of a process of examination are not 
ecessarily valid, eg a grant of a patent is no 
uarantee of validity. There are 'weak' and 
;trongl patents, ie patents whose validity is 
oubtful and others that more clearly conform to 
eatutory requirements (eg novelty and 
inventiveness). The strongest patents may well be 
those that have been litigated and found valid on a 
counterclaim for invalidity, but this is a small 
category indeed. 
However, it is ~ r o b a b l ~  the case that in an age of 
high litigation costs, a weak patent is just as 
effective a barrier to entry as a strong patent39. The 
cost of proving the invalidity of an apparently weak 
patent may be prohibitive. For the patentee, the fact 
that a granted patent is not necessarily valid means 
that there are hidden, uncertain and deferred costs 
attached to the process of patent grant and proof of 
validity. Litigating on the basis of a patent also 
risks destroying what apparent value a patent has if 
the result is a successful counterclaim for 
invalidity40. 
Interim conclusions: w o w  about innovation, not 
imitation 
So a tentative conclusion may be that in terms of 
stopping imitation, and on a wider front, protecting 
the intellectual capital of a firm, intellectual 
property is only marginally efficient. In any case, I 
would suggest that a competitive firm should be 
concerned by a competitor's innovation rather than 
imitation41! Effective innovation by other firms is 
likely to affect competitiveness far more in the long 
run. 
Because IPR's are costly, uncertain and difficult to 
enforce, of limited scope, easily subverted, and 
often function as a springboard rather than a 
deterrent for the firm's competitors, a firm should 
focus primarily on how to limit the impact of a 
competitor's innovation, rather than of a 
competitor's imitation. The lesson is simply; to use 
a hackneyed slogan: 'you've got to be in it to win 
itY. In other words, focus on IPR's as effective 
bargaining tools to obtain relevant knowledge and 
skills in the race to innovate. To put it differently, 
IPR's main value in a networked knowledge 
economy lies in their utility as transactional tools. 
Intellectual Capital Strategies 
From the above various broad strategic imperatives 
emerge for the innovative firm intent on 
maximising the value of its intellectual capital. To 
reiterate these: first, appropriate emphasis is 
required on the bargaining rather than barring uses 
of intellectual property rights, ie their transactional 
utility. Secondly, a firm should develop a broad and 
integrated strategy combining reliance on IPR's 
with other complementary strategies, and weighing 
up the strengths and weaknesses of various regimes. 
Thirdly, a careful choice must be made between 
investment in the development of alternative 
intellectual assets; in particular, the advantages of 
investment in the protection of goodwill over 
investing in substantive innovations will have to 
be considered. And lastly, an IC strategy will have 
to be employee-focussed. These strategic 
imperatives are developed in more detail in the 
following paragraphs. 
IPRS in a knowledge economy: transacational tools 
Limitations of the traditional view of the policy 
goals of IPR's 
Theory would have it that the granting of 
intellectual property rights in new knowledge 
enhances innovation: intellectual property rights 
are granted in response to market failure in the 
market for new knowledge. Sub-optimal levels of 
production of intangibles are said to occur 
because intangibles can be used without being 
depleted; have public good characteristics, ie are 
subject to positive externalities which cannot be 
captured by the creator; and the marginal cost of 
use or reproduction of intangibles is minimal 
compared to the cost of initial creation. Simply 
put, market failure results, because returns on 
investment in the production of knowledge and 
information cannot be captured in the absence of 
property rights. The first producer of knowledge 
will be trumped by the free rider who can use the 
knowledge while avoiding the cost of knowledge 
production and only suffering the marginal cost of 
imitation. 
Yet it is clear from what little empirical data are 
available, that many industries do not consider 
intellectual property (patents in particular) relevant 
to the decision whether to innovate or not42. 
Whether and to what extent intellectual property 
law encourages firms to innovate is a very open 
question. The devil lies in the detail: the wrong 
kind or scope of intellectual property laws can even 
have a detrimental effect on innovation rates43. 
In today's context, it may be that market and 
technology related factors have a far greater 
influence on the rate of imitation44. For one thing, 
the marginal cost of imitation is often 
underestimated or misunderstood. Intellectual 
property as codified knowledge is not necessarily 
readily deployable by a competitor, and the cost 
~f acquiring useful knowledge will thus often be 
higher than the cost of acquisition of codified 
~ntellectual property. The imitator must engage in 
1 more or less costly learning process, and must 
develop or acquire the tacit knowledge and know 
low that are not revealed by the codified 
tnowledge or the ~ r o d u c t  itself45. In other words, 
there is an imitation lag that allows innovators to 
consolidate market position, the so-called first- 
mover advantage. 
Further more, in a knowledge economy, with its 
pervasive networks and all-embracing standards, the 
distributed base of a new technology and the 
relationships built around the technology may pre- 
empt imitation and market entry by a competitor far 
more effectively than intellectual property law ever 
would. As technology becomes more complex, 
interdependency between innovator and customer 
becomes an important factor that bars customer 
transition to a competing (cheaper) imitator. And 
technological interdepen'den~~ between competitors 
will tend to organise imitative conduct more than 
legal rules will46. 
In any case, innovation rates (ie the rates of 
substitution of new technology) have risen so 
dramatically, that one comes to a stage where the 
imitation cycle is longer than the life cycle of the 
product, and imitation becomes a pointless activity. 
That intellectual property has unknown effects on 
the rate of innovation does not mean that it is not a 
valuable tool of the knowledge economy. The point 
is that intellectual property law enables participation 
in the knowledge economy, rather than exclusion 
from it. In a networked, hi-tech, high innovation 
economy, a firm's intellectual property is as, or 
more, useful as a bargaining than as a barring tool. 
Enforcement of intellectual property rights then 
takes on the role of sign-posting appropriate rules of 
market behavior rather than effectively denying 
imitation and copying. 
Bartering knowledge with IPR's 
Intellectual property, which tends to require material 
form and some precision in identification, aids with 
inventorying of intellectual capital. This process 
then also allows a firm to use a form of shorthand 
in advertising its intellectual capital base, without 
having to fully catalog the information as such: for 
instance, the number of patents in a firm's portfolio 
is an indicator of its level of intellectual capital. 
Demonstrable ownership of copyrights, design 
registrations, trade marks, circuit layout rights is 
advantageous in terms of valuing the firm, of 
attracting finance, of retaliation when faced with 
infringement litigation, and of commercial 
negotiations relating to licensing47. 
Intellectual property inventories also have 
considerable advantages to a firm because they 
enable participation of the firm in the networked 
knowledge economy. Knowledge is more and inore 1 
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complex and it is increasingly impossible for a 
single firm to 'own' all relevant knowledge that it 
needs to provide a complex technological product 
or service48. In such conditions, the strength of 
IPR's will be as a bargaining tool rather than a 
barring tool (ie barring imitation by threatened 
litigation). 
The resulting networked economy operates partly 
through knowledge barter: in other words, cross- 
licensing of intellectual property rights. The key is 
to focus on those advantages and to dismiss the 
illusions concerning IPR's as barring rights in any 
but the rarest cases. This is not to deny that 
litigation against imitators sometimes has strategic 
advantages. But an investment in building 
knowledge inventories will be much more readily 
justifiable that investing in litigation. 
The effect of the growth in proprietaty knowledge 
Various trends have resulted in a growth of 
proprietary knowledge. First, more knowledge is 
subject to appropriation because legislators and 
courts tend to expand rather than contract the 
categories of protection; secondly, firms (and other 
agents, such as universities) are increasingly 
~nterested in obtaining proprietary rights; and 
:hirdly, as the economy goes global, firms tend to 
>btain rights in a plurality of jurisdictions to a 
yeater extent than before. The result of these 
+ends is that firms will find themselves at risk of 
)eing barred from access to vital information that 
n-eviously may have been in the public domain. 
The only way of maintaining access to vital 
knowledge and technology is through developing 
proprietary networks of knowledge, ie networks 
of exchange of proprietary knowledge. Such 
networks function on the basis of confidentiality 
and reciprocity, ie cross- licensing arrangements. 
This is all the more the case where there is 
considerable pressure on patents law to move 
towards rewarding investment in research rather 
than inventiveness in research, certainly in highly 
scientific areas such as biote~hnology~~. Again, 
building knowledge inventories will be the key to 
successful participation in proprietary knowledge 
networks. 
IC strategies: integrating reliance on IPRS with other 
approaches 
The high cost and other shortcomings of IPR's 
imply that for a firm concerned to limit the effects 
of competitive imitation, alternative strategies not 
reliant on IPR's may be more efficient and more 
cost-effective. Alternatively, a firm should consider 
integrated strategies that combine reliance on 
IPR's with other approaches in a holistic fashion. I 
address some examples of both below. 
Perpetual innovation 
Probably the most effective strategy that does not 
rely on intellectual property rights, is perpetual 
innovation. In absolute terms, that is nothing new: 
simply put, it's staying ahead of the competition. But 
it is new in degree, in the sense that it requires the 
primary focus of the firm to be the management of 
knowledge for perpetunl innovation. As I said 
above, because obtaining and enforcing IPR's is so 
costly and slow, litigation or disputes often revolve 
around yesterday's technology. Rapid rates of 
technological change make that even truer today 
than it was in the past. Thus if a firm no longer 
relies on a technology or product for profitability, 
there will be little gained from enforcing IPR's. But 
the choice is not there unless a new technology or 
product can be substituted for the old. It is this 
process of constant intra-firm technological 
substitution that will liberate the firm from the need 
to pursue costly and high-risk strategies of reliance 
on and enforcement of rights in existing 
technologies and products. However, the 
effectiveness of a strategy of constant innovation 
will depend on a number factors, not the least being 
the installed base of the technology. 
Client inclusion in the innovation process 
I pointed out above that building proprietary 
knowledge networks is crucial in a knowledge 
economy. However, since successful innovation is 
often dependent on detailed improvements of an 
initial product, tying in access to the knowledge 
resources of clients will also be of vital interest to an 
innovative firm. Clients are important source of 
product knowledge, and the firm that maintains a 
two-way client relationship guarantees access to a 
vital future resource. Such relationships can be 
maintained by legal means (contractual provisions in 
licensing or supply agreements), but can also be 
maintained at the informal level and at the level of 
employee interaction. Mobility of employees 
between innovator and client is most useful in this 
respect. 
IPR's as technological determinants 
In terms of product choice and design strategy, 
designing products to maximise imitation lag is a 
well known strategy. But it is not unreasonable to 
suggest that the nature and extent of available IPR's 
should be taken into consideration in the course of 
the design process. How well does the design of a 
product protect the firm's intellectual capital, and 
are there changes in design that will make reliance 
on IPR's as barring tools more effective? There are 
of course technical and commercial limits to the 
extent to which IPR's can shape the design of a 
product, but since the IC of the firm is such a core 
asset in a knowledge economy, it is reasonable to 
suggest that such considerations should have a 
place. Some design elements may be purposely 
introduced to make detection and proof of 
imitation or infringement easier (the deliberate 
spelling error example). In other cases it is a 
question of preferring design choices that make 
imitation and reverse engineering harder and 
detection easier at the same time. 
Imitation 
An innovator is inevitably also an imitator, and 
the cost of imitation tends to be lower than the 
cost of innovation (hence the existence of IPR's). 
There is of course a risk of legal liability inherent 
in imitation. But the scope of IPR's tends to be 
quite narrow, so that the substance of innovative 
ideas can often be acquired without infringement, 
making imitation a sound and cost-effective 
strategy. Imitation in effect amounts to another 
form of acquisition of innovation. The 
imitationlinnovation decision is one that has to be 
made with regard to the existence and 
effectiveness of IPR's. Much advantage may be 
derived in terms of IPR's and strengthening a 
firm's bargaining position by a strategy of 
imitation and innovation. The development of 
improvements on a patented technology owned by 
a third party may give rise to an improvement 
patent; or ideas contained in a copyright based 
product may be re-deployed to greater effect or 
with greater graphic skill etc. 
Staged release 
A concomitant of perpetual innovation is staged 
product release. Many modern technologies are 
science-based and thus generic. They lend 
themselves to a multitude of different 
applications, forms, improvements, adaptations 
and efficiency gains. Many factors determine the 
timing of market introduction, but there is usually 
little to be gained by extending the delay between 
invention and market entry. IPR's tend to apply to 
?volutionary changes as much as to revolutionary 
breakthroughs. The standard of inventiveness for 
2atents is actually quite low, and the merit of the 
;ubject matter is irrelevant: a 20 year patent is 
ivailable for an improved ironing board just as 
nuch as for a revolutionary cancer-treating drug. 
Improvement patents may extend the effective 
nonopoly over a technology. In copyright law, the 
standard of originality is very low in Australia5'. 
Fairly minor changes to existing copyright works 
may result in an original work or subject matter that 
separately attracts copyright. Where the author of 
the changes is not the original author, the term of 
copyright may be usefully extended51. And designs 
registration is available for 'new or original' designs, 
but this usually requires only small changes in the 
appearance of a product52. Thus IPR's can be 
obtained and managed in a manner that will extend 
the effective life of legal protection of a basic 
innovation in technology or design. 
Being pro-active 
Because of the structural characteristics of the 
subsistence requirements of IPR's, failure to act early 
can cost innovators dearly. Options may be 
irrevocably lost by the failure to observe 
requirements for subsistence of IPR's, for instance, 
by revealing information before the filing of a patent 
application. In other words, the structure of IPR's 
rewards the pro-active firm which has structures in 
place for the early identification and processing of 
emerging IPR's. A relatively small initial investment 
may secure a valuable future position. 
Being pro-active can come at a cost, but savings at 
the early stage are false savings: initial costs are low, 
and a firm can opt out (allowing an application or 
registration to lapse) but cannot opt in (because 
novelty will have been lost). Costs can also be 
deferred for a considerable time without loss of 
privileges once the initial application is made. 
Strategic considerations undoubtedly come into play 
in pro-active decisions concerning the protection of 
rights, and these must be carefully evaluated. For 
instance, at what stage in the product development 
cycle does the firm apply for a relevant patent? 
Applying for a patent marks a transition from 
secrecy to publicity (although this may vary between 
jurisdictions depending on whether the application 
is published or not), and is therefore a strategically 
important decision. The choice between reliance on 
trade secrets law and on a patent, depends on many 
different factors, not least the nature of the 
technology involved. But the fact that there may be 
risks inherent in an early application does not mean 
a firm should not be proactive; the essential 
requirement is that, as a matter of course, active 
consideration is given to IPR protection as early as 
possible in the product development cycle. 
Cumulating rights 
Cumulating IPR's is also an effective way of 
enhancing the value of the intellectual capital of the 19 
firm. Modern intellectual property law permits of 
Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital 
more overlapping between different forms of 
protection. Examples are copyright and registered 
designs (which can be cumulated in some 
jurisdictions but not in others - or not wholly); 
designs registration and trade marks registration 
(because in most jurisdictions shape and 
packaging of goods can now be registered as trade 
marks); copyright and trade marks registration; 
etc. Some concrete illustrations: reliance on trade 
dress and on registered trade mark protection; 
ensuring a remedy against piracy of software by 
inclusion of a trade mark in software, so that an 
action can be brought in copyright and trade 
marks law; and grant of a software patent which 
gives the option of both relying on copyright 
protection and patents protection. 
A firm with more options will usually enjoy a 
wider scope of protection. Remedies may differ 
between regimes, and exceptions under one 
system may be inapplicable in another. As already 
referred to above, registering multiple IPR's within 
a single regime may also be effective, eg a general 
and improvement patents; product and process 
patents; registered trade marks in different signs; 
registered designs in slight modifications of the 
same design; etc. Some intellectual property 
regimes specifically allow for the registration of a 
number of similar or interdependent rights. 
Investing in goodwill or in innovation? 
The goodwill vs innovation trade-off 
There is a basic distinction in intellectual property 
law between rights in goodwill and rights in 
innovations. A firm must optimise the choice 
between investment in innovation or in goodwill. 
[n making this choice, it must evaluate the 
structural differences between the protection of 
;oodwill and of innovation (in the broad sense) in 
ntellectual property law. More precisely, it must 
tssess the advantages reliance on trade marks 
oegistration andlor passing off may have over 
:xclusive copyright, design and patent rights. 
fhe goodwill of a firm resides in the signs that 
:onsumers associate with it. Distinctive signs that 
Ire not confusing can be registered as trade marks 
md thus 'owned'. Although trade mark 
,egistration may obviate the need to prove 
,eputation and misrepresentation or deception in 
I given case, it admittedly has its limitations. Only 
ertain signs can be registered, and they tend to be 
mly a small fraction of the total interface between 
irm and consumer. Furthermore, the monopoly is 
lnly in relation to a certain class of goods or 
ervices (although well-known marks may 
generate a wider scope of monopoly) and is 
conditional on intended andlor actual use. 
Registration is also national, not international, 
which can leave well-known marks vulnerable in 
foreign markets. Trade mark registration is generally 
also subject to good faith-use exceptions and other 
derogation's, and the validity of a trade mark is not 
guaranteed by registration. If a trade mark is not 
well managed, it can be the victim of its own success 
and become generic rather than distinctive of the 
firm. Careless licensing practices can also result in 
trade marks becoming confusing or deceptive, or 
descriptive rather than distinctive of the trade mark 
owner, with a consequent loss of monopoly. 
An alternative to reliance on registered trade mark 
rights is to have recourse to an action in passing off, 
misleadingand deceptive conduct, unfair 
competition or the like, in relation to trade dress 
and other distinctive indicia of a firm's business or 
products. The evidentiary burden in such actions is 
greater, reputation and misrepresentation needing to 
be established in every case. Courts tend to be 
reluctant to enforce a monopoly in the appearance 
or design of a product through means of an action 
in passing off or sec 52 TPA in imitation cases 
(registered designs being the more appropriate 
avenue for protection). 
Advantages of goodwill 
Despite the abovementioned limitations, the 
protection of goodwill has several great advantages 
over monopolisation of ideas. First, it is not 
necessarily product specific, but can be - and 
frequently is - firm specific. The effective 'protection' 
of a product through designs, copyright, patents etc. 
might have to rely on a multitude of rights in 
constituent parts, creating potential transaction and 
management costs. Firm-specific goodwill does not 
suffer from this disparity: in other words, it is an 
over-arching right, certainly if effectively managed. 
This reduces transaction costs and increases the 
value of all products of the firm, ie firm-specific 
goodwill enhances the value of all other intellectual 
capital of the firm. 
A further advantage lies in the continuity of 
goodwill: protection does not run out. As long as a 
trade mark is used and does not become descriptive, 
deceptive or confusing, registration can be 
maintained. There is no cut-off date as there is in 
relation to other IPR's. The same effectively applies 
to unregistered trade marks and other elements of 
trade dress. The value of a trade mark therefore 
potentially increases with the passage of time, with 
increasing returns on investment in goodwill. A firm 
does not have to reinvest in a new image at given 
intervals, although it can choose to do so. 
Contrast this with the diminishing returns from 
investment in patents, designs, copyrights etc., 
which require a firm to invest in substitute 
innovations to maintain its monopoly position. 
Well-known merchandising characters are a good 
example of this: while the copyright in Mickey 
Mouse runs out 50 years after the death of its 
author, the Mickey Mouse trade mark can be 
maintained forever. Thus strategies that convert or 
leverage substance into goodwill have marked 
advantages. 
Goodwill protection is also less susceptible to 
subversion by new technologies than substantive 
rights. Copyright, for instance, has arguable failed 
to protect the interests of authors, composers and 
producers in relation to sound recordings on the 
Internet. At the same time, returns to musicians 
and producers from merchandising and other 
goodwill related activities have remained constant 
or grown, and are less affected by technological 
change. Arguably, an international trend in favour 
of goodwill protection is, not surprisingly, 
developing; moves to dramatically increase 
protection for geographical indications are 
illustrative of this. 
Investing in  goodwill or in innovation? 
Therefore investment choices in relation to the 
intellectual capital of the firm require careful 
consideration of the advantages of the protection 
of goodwill. Relative costs and potential for future 
returns must be compared. It may be that the 
exploitation of a successful patent, for instance, 
under which a new entrant can establish itself in a 
market, or create a barrier to entry by others, 
should be seen as the springboard for the longer 
term development of the goodwill of the firm. In 
other words, successful innovation should be seen 
as an opportunity to enhance the value of 
goodwill, which, when the monopoly in a patent 
runs out, can be maintained. Other products can 
then be developed under the 'umbrella' of 
continuous rights over goodwill, which will in 
turn enhance the value of future innovations, and 
so on. Thus innovation is leveraged for a future 
return in terms of the firm's goodwill or 
reputation. 
The balance between investment in goodwill and 
 her forms of IPR must depend on the 
5rcumstances of each firm and on its 
:ethnological base. Investment in goodwill and 
nnovation are not mutually exclusive. For 
instance, image building as a market-leader in 
innovation is a well-established strategy. And since 
reputation is as much about the quality of 
employees as about image-building, investment in 
people is an effective investment in goodwill. 
Strategies that attract and retain good employees 
will enhance business reputation, and enhance the 
value of those indicia of goodwill and reputation 
which a firm will be able to trade off in the future. 
Employee related strategies 
Tacit knowledge of employees 
Tacit knowledge is carried in the heads of 
employees, and in that form the law ensures that it 
remains quite mobile and rather outside the scope of 
legal control of the firm (see above). On the other 
hand, the law in most nations recognises that 
employers own the intellectual property rights in 
employees' (patented) inventions, although there are 
some limitations to this rules3. In this light, it seems 
to be to the advantage of the firm to pursue two 
strategiess4: first, externalking tacit knowledge; and 
secondly, attracting and retaining inventive 
employees. 
Externalization of knowledge - subject as it is to 
inherent limitations, because of the dynamic quality 
of knowledge - codifies tacit knowledge. It can then 
be rendered subject to IPR's. This has all the general 
advantages referred to above, and also strengthens 
the hand of the firm if a dispute concerning trade 
secrets or confidential information with an employee 
ensues in the future. Externalising tacit knowledge 
also allows a firm to build a more comprehensive 
knowledge inventory. The firm only obtains a return 
on investment in training if the employee is retained, 
or - to a degree at least - if the tacit knowledge of 
the employee is rendered explicit. 
Externalisation of knowledge can be encouraged in 
various ways: by offering employee - incentives (eg 
in the form of co-ownership of patents); by way of 
building in externalising procedures (eg maintaining 
logbooks; computerisation of procedures); by 
making employees aware of the value and 
importance of IPR's, and of obligations in relation 
to confidentiality and notification. It may even 
enhance a firm's position to encourage and support 
employees in establishing spin-offs and start-ups 
(subject to the firm having a stake). Strategies that 
encourage employees to externalise and be open 
about their inventions need not go to the length of 
promising full or partical employee ownership, but 
could take the form of a right to a royalty from 
commercial exploitation, or salary responses 
depending on the number of registered IPR's with 
2 1 
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the employee's as named inventoP. 
Retaining employees: 'incentivisation' 
But maybe more important than externalisation 
strategies is effective management aimed at 
retaining inventive employees. The strategy 
examples given in the previous paragraph are at 
least first steps in that process. They help the firm 
to identify the most valuable employees, and thus 
to offer timely incentives and rewards related to 
the production of IPR's. But intellectual capital is 
more than IPR's, and broader incentives of a more 
traditional kind might be more appropriate or 
effective. Nonetheless, there are advantages in 
tying employee reward more explicitly to the 
contribution to the intellectual capital of the firm. 
Conclusion: Integration Between IP And Non-IP 
Strategies 
The main point made in this paper is that 
intellectual capital is a broader concept than 
IPR's. To enhance the value of intellectual capital, 
the firm must use IPR's in combination with other 
strategies, while being fully cognizant of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the various IP 
regimes. The intellectual capital of the firm is its 
main asset in a knowledge economy, increasingly 
characterised by technological interdependency. 
Given the nature of IPR's, it is more effective to 
think of IPR's in terms of bargaining tools in such 
a market. Furthermore, there are other strategic 
decisions relating to intellectual property law that 
a firm must take with full recognition of the real 
limitations and real promise inherent in the 
various areas of intellectual property law. Thus a 
firm will have to focus on strategies to maximise 
the value of tacit knowledge, and also consider 
the value of goodwill over innovation when 
investing to enhance the value of intellectual 
capital. 
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business methods patents, industry has certainly embraced them 
in the United States, as have legal practitioners: see eg Kang PH, 
Snyder K, 'A practitioner's approach to strategic enforcement 
and analysis of business method patents in the post-State Street 
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:rajectories. The cumulative character of technological progress 
icilitates a rapid expansion of the boundaries of the technology 
lntil the natural limits of the technology are approached and 
:ethnological progress slows down. At that time decreasing 
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